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Defending Biotech COOs & Researchers Against Federal Biological Weapons Charges Under 18 U.S.C. § 175

Posted by Dmitry Gorin | Nov 16, 2026

Federal law under 18 U.S.C. § 175 prohibits the development, possession, or transfer of biological agents, toxins, or delivery systems for use as weapons. The statute also criminalizes possession of biological materials whose type or quantity cannot reasonably be justified by legitimate research or other peaceful purposes.

Defending Biotech COOs & Researchers Against Federal Biological Weapons Charges Under 18 U.S.C. § 175

These provisions can place biotechnology executives, university laboratory directors, and principal investigators under federal investigation when authorities question the purpose of their scientific activities.

For a Chief Operating Officer (COO) overseeing a commercial biotechnology laboratory or a principal investigator directing federally funded infectious disease research, an investigation may begin with disputed biological inventories, experimental protocols, or unauthorized materials transfers.

What Constitutes a Federal Biological Weapons Offense Under 18 U.S.C. § 175?

The federal Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act prohibits certain activities involving biological agents, toxins, and delivery systems. Under 18 U.S.C. § 175, two provisions are particularly relevant to biotechnology executives and researchers:

  • 18 U.S.C. § 175(a): Knowingly developing, producing, stockpiling, transferring, acquiring, retaining, or possessing biological agents, toxins, or delivery systems for use as weapons, including certain attempts, threats, conspiracies, and assistance
  • 18 U.S.C. § 175(b): Knowingly possessing biological agents, toxins, or delivery systems of a type or quantity that cannot reasonably be justified by legitimate prophylactic, protective, scientific research, or other peaceful purposes

Section 175(a) addresses prohibited weapons activity, while § 175(b) allows prosecution based on unjustified possession without requiring proof of an intended biological attack.

A biotech company's Director of Research Operations might face scrutiny when investigators discover biological materials retained outside an approved experimental program.

What Must Federal Prosecutors Prove in a Biological Weapons Case?

The elements of a federal biological weapons offense depend on whether prosecutors pursue charges under § 175(a) or § 175(b).

For a § 175(a) prosecution involving possession or development, prosecutors must establish that the defendant knowingly engaged in the prohibited conduct and that the biological materials or delivery systems were intended for use as weapons.

Under § 175(b), prosecutors must establish knowing possession of covered materials whose type or quantity, under the circumstances, lacked reasonable justification for legitimate peaceful purposes.

For biotechnology executives, prosecutors may rely on:

  • Internal communications discussing research objectives or unauthorized experiments
  • Laboratory inventory records showing unexplained biological materials
  • Evidence of continued research following compliance warnings
  • Materials transfers that are inconsistent with approved scientific programs
  • Experimental records suggesting purposes outside legitimate research

When Can Biological Sample Inventories Trigger a Federal Investigation?

Discrepancies involving biological inventories can raise concerns during federal inspections, particularly when laboratories possess materials subject to registration and reporting requirements. The Federal Select Agent Program, administered jointly by CDC/HHS and USDA/APHIS, oversees the possession, use, and transfer of regulated select agents and toxins.

Inspectors may identify findings such as:

  • Biological materials exceeding documented experimental requirements
  • Discrepancies between physical inventories and laboratory records
  • Materials retained after a research project has ended
  • Transfers involving facilities without appropriate registration
  • Biological agents maintained outside authorized laboratory locations

These findings may prompt additional regulatory scrutiny or referrals to criminal investigators.

A COO who approved expanded laboratory operations despite documented compliance concerns might become a focus of an investigation. Prosecutors may examine whether the executive understood what materials were being retained and why.

The scientific explanation remains central. Inventory records alone may not establish whether the disputed materials served legitimate research objectives.

Can a Federal Select Agent Violation Lead to Biological Weapons Charges?

Yes. Federal select agent violations can lead to criminal investigations. Under 18 U.S.C. § 175b, federal law imposes additional restrictions involving certain biological agents and toxins.

Relevant provisions include:

  • Section 175b(a): Prohibits certain restricted persons from possessing, receiving, shipping, or transporting covered agents or toxins in the specified circumstances
  • Section 175b(b): Prohibits transferring certain regulated materials to recipients the transferor knows or has reasonable cause to believe lack required registration
  • Section 175b(c): Prohibits knowing possession of specified regulated materials without required registration

The Select Agent Regulations also establish registration and compliance requirements for covered research facilities.

A Director of Biosafety might face regulatory scrutiny concerning facility access or inventory documentation. A COO authorizing transfers to an unregistered recipient could face separate criminal exposure under § 175b.

What Are the Penalties and Proof Standards for Federal Biological Weapons Offenses?

Federal biological weapons charges under 18 U.S.C. § 175 and § 175b carry severe criminal penalties and depend on specific evidentiary standards regarding intent, possession, and scientific justification.

Statute & Charge

Prosecution Evidentiary Standard

Statutory Penalties

18 U.S.C. § 175(a)

Prohibited Biological Weapons Activity

Material was knowingly possessed or developed for use as a weapon. Up to life imprisonment in federal prison and severe statutory fines.

18 U.S.C. § 175(b)

Unjustified Possession of Biological Agents

Possession of agents in a type or quantity lacking a legitimate research purpose. Up to 10 years in federal prison and statutory fines.

18 U.S.C. § 175b(a)

Possession by Restricted Persons

A restricted person knowingly possessed, shipped, or received covered agents/toxins. Up to 10 years in federal prison and statutory fines.

18 U.S.C. § 175b(b) & (c)

Unlawful Select Agent Transfers & Registration

Possessing select agents without registration or transferring to unregistered recipients. Up to 5 years in federal prison and statutory fines.

Federal law also permits seizure, forfeiture, and destruction of certain biological materials under 18 U.S.C. § 176, subject to statutory requirements and protections.

For biotechnology companies, forfeiture proceedings and restrictions on research materials can disrupt ongoing laboratory operations. Individual executives may also face separate investigations concerning their authorization or handling of disputed materials.

What Federal Statutes Are Related to Biological Weapons Charges Under 18 U.S.C. § 175?

Understanding related federal statutes is critical because federal prosecutors frequently combine multiple statutory counts or pivot to companion offenses when investigating research operations, laboratory inventory discrepancies, and biological material transfers:

  • 18 U.S.C. § 175b – Unlawful Possession and Transfer of Select Agents: Prohibits restricted persons from possessing select biological agents or toxins, bans transfers to unregistered individuals, and penalizes unapproved possession of regulated pathogens.

  • 18 U.S.C. § 175c – Variola Virus Prohibitions: Strictly criminalizes the unauthorized production, synthesis, acquisition, transfer, possession, or import/export of the smallpox virus (variola virus).

  • 18 U.S.C. § 1001 – False Statements to Federal Investigators: Penalizes making materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statements or concealing material facts during inspections or interviews conducted by federal agencies such as the FBI, CDC, or USDA.

  • 18 U.S.C. § 1343 – Wire Fraud: Frequently charged alongside regulatory or biological weapons allegations when prosecutors contend that research grants, federal funding, or material transfer agreements were obtained through fraudulent misrepresentations.

  • 18 U.S.C. § 371 – Conspiracy to Commit an Offense against the United States: Criminalizes agreements between two or more individuals—such as corporate executives, biosafety officers, or researchers—to execute prohibited activities, transfer controlled materials, or bypass federal select agent regulations.

How Can Biotech COOs and Researchers Challenge Biological Weapons Allegations?

Several legal defenses may apply, depending on the alleged conduct, the biological materials involved, and the defendant's actual responsibilities.

  • Legitimate scientific purpose: Research proposals, peer-reviewed publications, experimental protocols, and documented scientific objectives may establish that disputed materials were retained for lawful research rather than prohibited weapons activity.
  • Reasonable possession: Independent scientific experts may demonstrate that the type and quantity of biological materials were appropriate for the experiments actually conducted, addressing allegations under § 175(b).
  • Lack of knowing participation: A COO overseeing financial operations and facility management may have approved expenditures without knowing that laboratory personnel possessed particular biological materials or conducted unauthorized experiments.
  • Insufficient evidence of prohibited use: Technical terminology, experimental results, or laboratory equipment may be misinterpreted without proper scientific context. Expert analysis may challenge allegations that research involved weapon development.
  • Regulatory authorization: Registration documents, approved transfers, and access records may undermine particular § 175b allegations where the relevant materials and activities were properly authorized.

How Can Scientific Experts Support a Pre-Indictment Defense?

Federal biological weapons investigations may involve FBI weapons of mass destruction investigators, federal prosecutors, and regulatory agencies overseeing laboratory compliance.

Early intervention may allow attorneys to present a scientifically supported explanation before prosecutors decide whether to seek an indictment. This can be particularly valuable when investigators lack the specialized expertise needed to interpret complex research records.

Scientific experts can provide findings that attorneys use during discussions with federal prosecutors. The objective is to establish what the research actually involved and whether the evidence supports the specific offenses under investigation.

Hypothetical Case Study: Defense of a Biotech COO Investigated for Unauthorized Biological Research

Background & Inspection Discrepancies

The Chief Operating Officer of a biotechnology company oversaw a $45 million infectious disease research program developing experimental vaccine candidates.

During a federal inspection, regulators discovered discrepancies involving biological materials retained after an earlier research phase had concluded. Laboratory records showed that certain biological agents remained in storage despite internal instructions requiring additional administrative review.

Escalation to Criminal Investigation

The federal investigation escalated when agents obtained emails showing that the COO authorized continued laboratory operations after the company's Director of Biosafety warned that portions of the research program lacked required regulatory approvals.

Further examination revealed that laboratory personnel had conducted experiments under revised protocols that had not completed the company's internal review process.

Federal investigators suspected the company retained biological materials beyond legitimate research requirements, leading prosecutors to examine potential charges under 18 U.S.C. § 175(b) for unjustified possession and 18 U.S.C. § 175(a) for prohibited weapons purposes.

Defense Strategy & Pre-Indictment Intervention

Defense counsel at Eisner Gorin LLP retained independent biosafety specialists and infectious disease researchers to analyze:

  • The laboratory's notebooks,
  • Experimental requirements, and
  • Biological inventories.

While their analysis identified compliance deficiencies and improperly documented protocol modifications, original laboratory data established that the disputed materials were scientifically necessary for ongoing vaccine research.

Furthermore, expert findings confirmed that the documented experimental work reasonably justified the exact quantities retained.

Additional communications showed that the COO authorized continued operations, believing the unresolved issues involved routine administrative approvals rather than unauthorized research outside the program scope.

Resolution

Our defense attorneys presented these scientific findings to federal prosecutors during pre-indictment negotiations, directly addressing the COO's state of mind and establishing legitimate scientific justification under § 175(b).

Prosecutors ultimately declined to pursue biological weapons charges under 18 U.S.C. § 175 against the COO, leaving the company subject only to separate civil regulatory enforcement regarding laboratory compliance procedures.

Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)

Understanding these FAQs is vital for biotech executives and laboratory researchers because federal biological weapons investigations turn on nuanced scientific definitions, strict evidentiary standards, and complex regulatory compliance obligations.

Could a researcher be charged without intending to weaponize a biological agent?

Yes. While certain offenses require prosecutors to prove that a biological agent or delivery system was intended for use as a weapon, federal law also establishes a separate offense that does not require proof of weaponization intent. Prosecutors only need to establish that a person knowingly possessed a biological agent or toxin of a type or quantity that lacks reasonable justification for legitimate research, protective, or peaceful purposes.

What qualifies as "legitimate research" under federal biological weapons laws?

Federal courts evaluate whether biological materials serve bona fide scientific, protective, or prophylactic objectives by examining experimental protocols, peer-reviewed publications, research grant proposals, and approved laboratory projects. If the quantity or specific strain of a biological agent retained in storage cannot be linked to active, authorized research, federal agents may assert that the possession lacks legitimate scientific justification.

How do federal select agent regulatory violations escalate into criminal charges?

Discrepancies identified during routine inspections by regulatory programs—such as unrecorded sample inventories, missing transfer documentation, or expired facility registrations—can prompt referrals to criminal investigators. If investigators uncover evidence suggesting that compliance failures were knowing, or that unapproved experiments were deliberately conducted, administrative regulatory violations can quickly trigger criminal prosecutions.

Can a COO or lab director face criminal liability for staff actions?

A corporate officer or laboratory director can face criminal exposure if prosecutors assert that the executive authorized, directed, or knowingly tolerated unauthorized research activities. Prosecutors often rely on internal communications, budget approvals, and biosafety compliance warnings to argue that executive management knew of illegal material retention or unapproved experimental modifications.

What do scientific defense experts do in a pre-indictment federal investigation?

Independent biosafety experts, toxicologists, and infectious disease researchers play a critical role by reviewing laboratory notebooks, experimental data, and inventory logs to provide an objective scientific framework. Defense attorneys present these expert findings to prosecutors during pre-indictment discussions to demonstrate that disputed biological materials were retained for valid scientific purposes, often persuading prosecutors to drop charges or decline indictment.

What are the maximum penalties for a conviction?

Penalties depend on the specific charge federal prosecutors bring. Charges involving biological weapons development or possession carry up to life imprisonment in federal prison. Charges for unjustified possession carry up to 10 years in federal prison, alongside substantial federal fines and forfeiture of research assets.

Speak to a Criminal Defense Lawyer

When facing potential federal indictments under 18 U.S.C. § 175 or related select agent regulations, the decisions made before charges are formally filed often dictate the outcome of the entire case.

Reaching out to an experienced federal criminal defense team allows for immediate pre-indictment intervention, protection of constitutional rights during agency audits or FBI interviews, and early coordination with specialized scientific experts.

Contact our legal offices at Eisner Gorin LLP today to schedule a strictly confidential consultation and begin building an aggressive defense strategy.

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About the Author

Dmitry Gorin

Dmitry Gorin is a State-Bar Certified Criminal Law Specialist, who has been involved in criminal trial work and pretrial litigation since 1994. Before becoming partner in Eisner Gorin LLP, Mr. Gorin was a Senior Deputy District Attorney in Los Angeles Courts for more than ten years. As a criminal tri...

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